Poland's Constitutional Crisis: Ten Years of Eroding Trust, One Dangerous Escalation
Poland's Constitutional Crisis: Ten Years of Eroding Trust, One Dangerous Escalation
By Jadwiga Emilewicz
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Poland
The dramatic events that unfolded at Poland's Constitutional Tribunal on October 30, 2026, mark a dangerous new chapter in a constitutional crisis that has been developing for more than a decade. What began in 2015 as a dispute over judicial appointments has now escalated into a confrontation involving police forces, competing claims to judicial authority, and the physical obstruction of access to one of Poland's most important constitutional institutions.
To understand the gravity of these events, we must first acknowledge an uncomfortable truth: Poland's constitutional crisis did not begin with the current government of Donald Tusk. Nor can it be explained simply as the consequence of the policies pursued by the previous Law and Justice (PiS) government. Both political camps have contributed to the erosion of constitutional trust, although in different ways and at different stages of the conflict.
The crisis began in 2015, when the outgoing parliamentary majority led by Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish People's Party (PSL) attempted to appoint five Constitutional Tribunal judges shortly before the parliamentary elections. Three appointments concerned vacancies arising during that parliament's term, while two concerned vacancies that would arise only after the newly elected parliament had taken office.
In December 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal itself ruled that the appointment of the first three judges had been constitutional, but the advance appointment of the remaining two had not.
The incoming PiS majority, however, went further than correcting those two contested appointments. It challenged all five appointments made by its predecessors and elected five new judges. President Andrzej Duda declined to administer the oath to the three judges whose election had been found constitutional.
Subsequent legislative changes affecting the Tribunal's functioning, together with disputes over judicial appointments and the publication of judgments, deepened the crisis. These developments attracted serious criticism from European institutions and contributed to a prolonged confrontation between Warsaw and Brussels.
There is no reason to deny these facts. Constitutional principles must be respected regardless of which political party happens to hold power.
Yet acknowledging the mistakes of the past does not provide the present government with unlimited authority to correct them.
When Donald Tusk returned to power in December 2023, his government promised to restore the rule of law. This was a legitimate political objective, particularly given the unresolved disputes surrounding the judiciary. But a fundamental question has increasingly emerged: can the rule of law be restored through methods that themselves raise serious constitutional objections?
The events of October 30 suggest that this question is no longer theoretical.
On that Friday, substantial police forces were deployed around the Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw. At the same time, Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, whose very status as a Constitutional Tribunal judge remains legally contested, claimed the authority to take over the institution's leadership. Although elected by the parliamentary majority, she had not taken the constitutionally required oath in the presence of the President of the Republic. Instead, she participated in an alternative oath-taking ceremony in parliament, the legal validity of which is disputed.
Despite these unresolved fundamental questions concerning her own judicial status, she proceeded to issue orders purporting to suspend the Tribunal's President, Bogdan Święczkowski, and Vice-President, Bartłomiej Sochański, from their official duties.
The legal justification for these actions relied in part on Article 130 of the Law on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts. Yet the Constitutional Tribunal is not an ordinary court. It is an independent constitutional institution whose status, composition and functioning are governed by specific constitutional and statutory provisions.
This distinction is not a legal technicality. It goes to the heart of the separation of powers.
Zbigniew Kapiński, First President of Poland's Supreme Court, publicly challenged the legal basis for the suspension orders. He argued that the provisions invoked did not confer authority to remove the Tribunal's leadership in this manner. He also warned against using police powers to exert pressure on independent constitutional institutions.
Professor Jacek Chlebny, President of the Supreme Administrative Court, issued a separate and equally serious statement. He described the police presence and the obstruction of access to the Tribunal by its President and Vice-President as unprecedented, and warned that constitutional boundaries had been crossed.
These objections cannot simply be dismissed as another episode in Poland's partisan conflict. They were expressed by the heads of two of the country's highest judicial institutions and concerned the legality of the methods employed.
The confrontation escalated further during the night.
President Karol Nawrocki, who had been travelling to Senegal, interrupted his journey and returned to Warsaw. After consultations with senior judicial officials, he went to the Constitutional Tribunal, where individuals at the entrance attempted to prevent him from entering. The confrontation became physical before the President ultimately gained access to the building.
The President subsequently declared that Poland's constitutional order had been violated and called for the withdrawal of police forces and the restoration of the Tribunal's lawful functioning.
Whatever one's political assessment of President Nawrocki, the sight of a democratically elected head of state confronting physical obstruction at the entrance to a constitutional institution should alarm anyone concerned about the stability of democratic government.
There is, of course, another side to this dispute. The current parliamentary majority argues that the Tribunal has been deprived of its independence and effectiveness by the previous government's actions. It also maintains that judges elected by the Sejm must be allowed to assume their constitutional responsibilities. These concerns cannot be ignored, particularly in light of relevant European court judgments.
But even a legitimate objective does not automatically legitimise every means used to achieve it.
A constitutional democracy cannot function if each successive government believes it is entitled to disregard existing legal procedures in order to reverse the decisions of its predecessor.
The rule of law is not simply about achieving the right political outcome. It is about respecting the rules even when they make that outcome more difficult to achieve.
The response from European institutions adds another important dimension to this crisis.
The European Commission has been closely involved in Poland's rule-of-law disputes since 2015. It repeatedly criticised the previous PiS government, supported judicial independence, and insisted on compliance with European legal standards.
Following the events of October 30, Commission representatives were quick to emphasise the constitutional authority of the Polish parliament to appoint Constitutional Tribunal judges. They also referred to relevant European court decisions supporting the rights of newly appointed judges to exercise their duties.
These are important legal considerations. But they do not resolve the separate question of whether the suspension of the Tribunal's leadership, the involvement of police forces and the restrictions on access to the institution were lawful and proportionate.
So far, the Commission's public response has placed considerably greater emphasis on the legitimacy of parliamentary judicial appointments than on the constitutional objections raised against the methods used during the confrontation.
This asymmetry deserves scrutiny.
If the European Union wishes to remain a credible defender of the rule of law, it must apply consistent standards to governments of different political orientations. Judicial independence cannot be a principle defended vigorously when conservatives are in power and interpreted more flexibly when a pro-European government takes office.
The same standards must apply to everyone.
For Poland, the consequences of this prolonged constitutional conflict extend far beyond the fate of the Constitutional Tribunal itself.
For more than a decade, successive political majorities have treated constitutional institutions as arenas of political competition. Each side has justified its actions by invoking the alleged illegality of its predecessor's decisions. The result is a dangerous cycle in which the legitimacy of institutions increasingly depends on political affiliation rather than public confidence in the constitutional order.
The October confrontation demonstrates how far this process has advanced. A dispute that once concerned judicial appointments and constitutional interpretation has now reached the point where police forces, physical access to public institutions and competing claims of authority have become part of the political struggle.
This is an alarming development for a country that has spent the past three decades building democratic institutions, strengthening its economy and establishing itself as one of the most important states in Central Europe.
Poland is also a frontline NATO country, bordering a region destabilised by Russia's war against Ukraine. At a time of profound international uncertainty, institutional stability and public confidence in the state are not merely domestic political concerns. They are matters of national security.
The way forward cannot be another attempt by one political camp to impose a definitive victory over the other.
Poland needs a genuine constitutional settlement: one that recognises past mistakes, respects the independence of judicial institutions and establishes procedures that no future government will be tempted to circumvent.
Such a settlement will require political compromise. But compromise must be grounded in the Constitution, not negotiated at the expense of its fundamental principles.
Having served in government during part of this turbulent decade, I am convinced that Poland's greatest challenge is no longer simply to determine who was right in 2015 or who is right today. It is to rebuild institutions whose legitimacy can survive changes of government.
The events of October 30 should serve as a warning.
A democracy is not measured only by its ability to change governments. It is measured by its ability to preserve constitutional limits on power when governments change.
Poland cannot afford another decade in which the Constitution becomes an instrument of political confrontation rather than the common foundation of the Republic.
Jadwiga Emilewicz